Right to a Jury Trial for Persons Accused of an Ordinance Violation by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1962
Right to a Jury Trial for Persons Accused of an
Ordinance Violation
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Right to a Jury Trial for Persons Accused of an Ordinance Violation" (1962). Minnesota Law Review.
2784.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2784
Note
Right to a Jury Trial
for Persons Accused of
an Ordinance Violation
The right to trial by jury for persons accused of violating
a municipal ordinance has recently been re-examined by
both the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota
legislature. The author of this Note analyzes these cases
and statutes to determine the exact scope of this right
in Minnesota. He concludes that even though the jury
trial places an added burden upon our judicial machinery,
it is consistent with the needs of the accused ordinance
violator.
INTRODUCTION
In a northern Minnesota community a county attorney briefed a
J.P. on a pending case. The J.P. had just one question-"Do I have
to listen to the defendant's side of the case?"'
This attitude is certainly inconsistent with one of the aims
of the American judicial system-protecting the defendant in a
judicial proceeding from injustice. Surrounding the defendant with
"strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will
be equal justice under the law."2 The American judicial system
may be described as one that gives priority to the defendant, as
distinguished from a system that gives priority to the interest of
society in having its police regulations enforced. Although crimi-
nal law must necessarily be concerned with the needs of society,
this concern should not be allowed to subvert the needs and in-
1. Minneapolis Morning Tribune, April 9, 1962, p. 1, col. 3. This article
also describes other examples of the lack of concern for the rights of a
defendant shown by some courts:
In an Iron Range town, a motorist told a J.P. he was not guilty
of a traffic violation. The J.P. replied, "What you say may be true,
but after all you did get a ticket. Guilty."
A 'southwestern Minnesota Lawyer argued a case for his client
until the J.P. stopped him impatiently. "Never mind," said the J.P.
"We're here to fine him."
2. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179
(1951) (concurring opinion).
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terests of the accused.3 Protecting the rights of the defendant
with procedural safeguards is important not only when he is
charged with the most heinous felony, but also when he is ac-
cused of violating only a municipal ordinance.
Municipal ordinances treat a multitude of subjects and circum-
scribe human conduct more than any other area of the law.4
Thus, the cities, rather than the federal or state governments,
exert the greatest direct influence over the everyday life of the
individual.5 The vast control that the municipality exerts over its
citizens is especially emphasized today because of the rapid shift
in the concentration of population from rural to urban areas.' The
extent to which individuals are subjected to municipal ordinances
underscores the need to provide persons accused of violating these
ordinances with adequate procedural safeguards.
One important procedural safeguard that has recently been re-
examined by both the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minne-
sota legislature is the right to trial by jury. By virtue of court de-
cision7 and legislative mandate,' the accused ordinance violator
has been guaranteed the right to trial by jury either at the muni-
cipal court or justice of the peace level' or upon appeal to the
3. See FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 1 (1958).
4. Besides having power to regulate in such specific areas as crime
prevention and liquor control, cities are usually granted the authority "to
enact all ordinances, and to make such regulations, consistent with the
laws and constitution of the state as they may deem necessary for the
safety, order, and good government of the city, and the general welfare
of the inhabitants." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 91.1 (1948). See also MINN.
STAT. § 410.07 (1961).
5.
Washington's decisions exert a vital force in directing our lives, but
the cities actually enjoy the intimate day-to-day direction over one's
conduct. Certainly the states are invested with police powers, but
who exercises this power? It is the city that really exercises the police
powers of the state, and to that it adds its own police power.
Note, 37 U. DET. L.J. 730 (1960).
6.
The rapid growth in our urban population from less than 10 per-
cent in 1860 to over 50 percent in 1950 has increased the need for
the regulation of crime, and this need has received little consideration
on the state level but has been dealt with largely through an expansion
of local regulation in the form of municipal ordinances.
State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 176, 79 N.W.2d 136, 138 (1956).
7. State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959), 44 MINN.
L. REv. 755 (1960).
8. MINN. STAT. § 484.63 (1961).
9. Hereinafter, references to a municipal court are directed to a justice
of the peace court where no municipal court has been established. Ajustice of the peace court has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in i
political subdivision in a county that does not have a municipal court. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 488.04(5) (c), 633.01(4) (1961).
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district court. These decisions and statutes have, however, given
rise to some confusion as to the exact scope of this right. The pur-
pose of this Note is to clarify existing Minnesota law regarding
the right of a person accused of violating a municipal ordinance
to a trial by jury.
I. NATURE OF A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE VIOLATION
In determining the procedural safeguards to which a municipal
ordinance violator is entitled, courts have generally deemed it
necessary to ascertain whether proceedings under such an ordi-
nance are of a "civil" or "criminal" nature.Y These determinations
have not been consistent;" however, a majority of the state courts
have regarded such proceedings as civil actions.' This attempt
10. See 9 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27.30 (3d ed.
1950); Note, 24 GEo. L.J 440 (1936). The Minnesota court has recently
expressed the more reasonable approach to such a distinction:
Instead of trying to distinguish such ordinances on the basis that they
are civil, noncriminal, or quasi-criminal, it should be frankly recognized
that they are criminal enactments which are historically sui generis.
State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 178, 79 N.W.2d 136, 140 (1956).
11. Note, Penal Ordinances in California, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 123
(1936); see Hutchins v. City of Stevenson, 31 Ala. App. 435, 18 So. 2d
142 (1944) (civil for purpose of appellate procedure); City of Chicago
v. Teamey, 187 Ill. App. 441 (1914) (civil for the purpose of the require-
ment of arraignment and plea); State v. McCabe, 251 Minn. 212, 87
N.W.2d 360 (1957) (civil for determining rules of sufficiency of evidence);
Village of Crosby v. Stemich, 160 Minn. 261, 199 N.W. 918 (1924) (crimi-
nal for purposes of appellate procedure); City of St. Paul v. Stamm, 106
Minn. 81, 118 N.W. 154 (1908) (criminal for purpose of preventing appeal
by the city); State v. Jackson, 220 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) (civil
for purpose of double jeopardy doctrine); City of Stanberry v. O'Neal,
166 Mo. App. 709, 150 S.W. 1104 (1912) (criminal for purpose of suf-
ficiency of evidence); cf. Note, 46 MINN. L. REv. 169, 173-74 (1961).
12. The justification for labeling municipal ordinance violation pro-
ceedings "civil" appears to be purely historical.
According to the law of England as it stood at the time when we
received thence our unwritten law, a municipal corporation could not
make a by-law on which an indictment or a summary prosecution
before a magistrate could be maintained; and neither imprisonment
nor disenfranchisement could be provided for disobedience. There-
fore the ancient by-laws used to provide, that, for a breach of a pro-
vision, the offender should forfeit a sum named . . . . mhe method
of recovering the penalty, mostly employed, was by an action of debt,
or sometimes of assumpsit ....
BISHOP, STATUTORY CRIMES § 403 (1873). The same considerations that
gave rise to the use of a civil proceeding for enforcement of a municipal
ordinance violation do not seem to be applicable today because many
municipal ordinances now provide for imprisonment. E.g., DULUTH,
MINN., CITY CODE § 1-7 (1959); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDI-
NANCES § 1.120 (1960).
Another justification for prosecuting an ordinance violation as a "civil"
action may be that the public will not consider the defendant a criminal.
19621
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to label such a proceeding as either civil or criminal is actually
irrelevant to the issue of procedural safeguards because it focuses
on the effect of the defendant's act upon the community rather
than on the effect of the prosecution upon the defendant.13
Whether such a proceeding is regarded as civil or criminal, a
person accused of violating a municipal ordinance in Minnesota
does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in the municipal
court.14 If the proceeding is regarded as "civil," the defendant
does not have a right to a jury trial under the Minnesota Con-
stitution. While article 1, section 4, does provide that "the right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases
at law," it has been construed as merely confirming and securing
that right as it was understood at common law prior to the adop-
tion of the state constitution.' Since the common law did not
afford the right to jury trial to persons accused of violating a mu-
nicipal ordinance," a defendant cannot invoke this constitutional
guarantee. Nor is the defendant entitled to a jury trial under the
Minnesota Constitution if the proceeding is regarded as "criminal."
Article 1, section 6, declares that "in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury. . . ." This provision has been applied only to
"prosecutions for offenses essentially criminal under the general
This justification seems unsound, however, because
without much education the public will not differentiate between
names, when the effects of the procedures (financial loss and award-
ing of points toward loss of driver's license) are the same.
Conway, Is Criminal or Civil Procedure Proper for Enforcement of
Traffic Laws?, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 418, 444.
13. See authorities cited note 19 infra; 72 HARv. L. Rav. 377 (1958).
The Minnesota court in State ex rel. Erickson v. West, 42 Minn. 147,
152, 43 N.W. 845, 847 (1889), stated:
A municipal ordinance is as much a law for the protection of the
public as is a criminal statute of the state, the only difference being
that the one is designed for the protection of the municipality
and the other for the protection of the whole state . . . . [H]ow can
it make any difference, either in the intrinsic nature of the thing or
in the consequences to the accused, whether the state does this[enforcing] itself, or delegates the power to pass the law to the munici-
pal authorities?
14. Clearly he has no federal constitutional right because the seventh
amendment of the federal constitution does not limit the powers of state
governments with respect to state citizens. See Barron v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); 9 M'CQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 27.33, .34 (3d ed. 1950). Furthermore, the exercise of summaryjurisdiction in a municipal ordinance prosecution does not contravene the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Walker v. Sauvinet,
92 U.S. 90 (1875); 9 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27.34
(3d ed. 1950).
15. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N.W. 305 (1886).
16. See 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 428 (3d ed. 1881).
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laws of the state."'7 The violation of a municipal ordinance is
not regarded as a crime against the public law, but merely as a
violation of a regulation made for the benefit of the inhabitants
of a particular place. 8 To deny the defendant a jury trial on the
basis of such reasoning does not seem to be in accord with the
desire to protect the defendant from injustice since he needs this
protection whether the prosecuting authority is the state or a muni-
cipality.19
11. THE HOBEN UNIFORMITY DOCTRINE
Although no constitutional right to trial by jury for violation
of a municipal ordinance exists, in some states this right is ex-
pressly granted by statute.2" In Minnesota, however, the Munici-
pal Court Act.provides that persons charged with violation of a
municipal ordinance shall be tried in municipal court without a
jury.' Notwithstanding this provision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in State v. Hoben,22 held that a person charged with the
violation of a municipal ordinance that prohibited driving while
intoxicated was entitled to a jury trial in the municipal court. The
court observed that the Highway Traffic Regulation Act also pro-
hibited driving while intoxicated and further provided that "when
any local ordinance regulating traffic covers the same subject for
which a penalty is provided for in this chapter, then the penalty
provided for violation of said local ordinance shall be identical
with the penalty provided for in this chapter for the same
offense."'m The court reasoned that because the penalties pre-
scribed by the local ordinance and state statute were to be identi-
cal, the procedures to be followed must also be identical.2 ' Thus,
17. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 64, 30 N.W. 305, 306
(1886). (Emphasis added.)
18. Id. at 64-65, 30 N.W. at 307.
19. See City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614
(1958); City of Grant City v. Simmons, 167 Mo. App. 183, 151 S.W. 187(1912); City of Stanberry v. O'Neal, 166 Mo. App. 709, 150 S.W. 1104
(1912); FELLMAN, THE DEFENDAN's RIGHTs 2 (1958). Compare State
ex rel. Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 273 N.W. 233 (1937).
20. E.g., ILL. REv. ST.AT. ch. 37, § 385 (1961), City of Chicago v. Har-
rington, 263 Ill. App. 47 (1931). See also City of Rochester v. Falk, 7
N.Y.S.2d 517 (Rochester City Ct. 1938), where the right to a jury trial
was implied under a city charter providing that ordinance violations be
tried as misdemeanors.
21. MrNN. STAT. § 488.04(5)(2)(c) (1961) (formerly Minn. Stat. §
488.09 (1957)).
22. 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959).
23. MINN. STAT. § 169.03 (1961).
24. The court in Hoben noted that the penalties provided by the ordi-
nance involved were not "identical" with those provided by the statute,
19621 NOTE
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where a state statute requires that any municipal ordinance cover-
ing the same subject must provide for identical penalties and
where a person violating the state statute is entitled to a jury trial,
the rule for uniformity in the treatment of defendants applies
to also give a person charged under such a municipal ordinance
a right to a jury trial.2 5
Whether, as a condition for the application of this uniformity
doctrine, the state statute had to expressly declare that any local
ordinance regulating the same subject should provide identical
penalties was uncertain after the Hoben case. This confusion prob-
ably arose because City of Canon City v. Merris" was cited with
approval in Hoben. In the Merris case, a Colorado criminal statute
and a municipal ordinance prohibited the same conduct, but the
state statute did not contain an express provision for uniform
penalties. The court, nevertheless, held that defendants under both
the municipal ordinance and the state statute should be entitled
to uniform treatment. The right to procedural safeguards did not
depend upon which level of the government chose to prose-
cute,17 but rather upon the possible effects and consequences of
the prosecution on the defendant.2 In State ex rel. Sheahan v.
Mulally, however, the Minnesota court stated that the Hoben
but concluded that it was unnecessary to discuss the issue as to whether
the ordinance was so inconsistent with the state law as to be invalid.25. Although the Hoben decision seems to emphasize that the subject
of the prosecution must be related to a matter of statewide rather thanlocal concern, this may mean only that the legislature must manifest in the
statute the intent that the prosecution of such conduct is to be uniform
throughout the state. In a later case the court pointed out that "unlike
the Hoben case, the subject of the prosecution before us relates to a
matter of local concern. Although § 615.17 punishes disorderly conduct,
it does not prohibit, limit, or restrict a municipality from legislating on
the same subject." State ex rel. Sheahan v. Mulally, 257 Minn. 27, 29,99 N.W.2d 892, 894 (1959). (Emphasis added.) Thus, the fact that a state
statute deals with a particular subject does not mean that the subject is of
statewide concern; there must also be a provision for uniform treatment
throughout the state.
26. 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
27. Id. at 181, 323 P.2d at 620.
Whether driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
is a local and municipal matter or of state-wide concern makes littledifference . . . . Since there is a statute making such conduct a
crime, its counterpart in the municipal laws . . . must be tried and
punished as a crime.
28. The Colorado court was particularly concerned with the power of
a court to imprison a person convicted of violation of a municipal ordi-
nance.
Label the judicial process as one will, no resort to subtlety can refute
the fact that the power to imprison is a criminal sanction. To view
otherwise is self-delusion. Courts should not, ostrich-like, bury their
heads in the sand.
Id. at 174, 323 P.2d at 617.
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doctrine was "limited specifically to highway traffic regulations.""
The effect of this limitation is to make the technical requirement
of an express provision in the state statute for uniform penalties
an essential part of the uniformity doctrine." This requirement
should be unnecessary. Uniformity of treatment may be considered
an implied limitation upon all statutes and municipal ordinances
because the legislature would not intend to make basic civil rights
contingent upon an arbitrary choice of forum. As the court said
in Hoben:
It would be a strange anomaly for the legislature to define a crime,
specify punishment therefor, provide that its application shall be un-
iform throughout the state, and then permit a municipality to pros-
ecute that crime as a civil offense. Basic civil rights of the defendant
would then depend upon the arbitrary choice of the prosecutive
authorities as to the court in which action against him would be insti-
tuted. l'
It would seem to be equally anomalous for the legislature, even
without expressly providing for uniformity, to define an offense
with the intent that there should be non-uniform treatment through-
out the state.32
Ill. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL UPON
APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT
A person convicted of an ordinance violation in a municipal
court presently has a right to appeal.33 The procedure for this
29. 257 Minn. 27, 29, 99 N.W.2d 892, 894 (1959).
30. In the Mulally case the defendant was charged with disorderly
conduct under a municipal ordinance. He tried to assert a right under the
Hoben doctrine to a jury trial in the municipal court because MINN. STAT.
§ 615.17 also made disorderly conduct a crime. The court denied this
right because the Hoben doctrine was limited to the area of traffic regu-
lation. Whether the Hoben doctrine is so limited is questionable. If the
court were faced with the assertion of the Hoben right where a statute
did not deal with traffic regulations, but did provide that "its provisions
be 'applicable and uniform throughout the state and in all political sub-
divisions and municipalities' and that the penalties contained in ordinances
.. .be identical with those contained in the statute," it would undoubtedly
grant a defendant charged with a violation of a municipal ordinance dealing
with the same subject matter as the statute a right to a jury trial in the
municipal court. 257 Minn. at 29, 99 N.W.2d at 893.
31. State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 444, 98 N.W.2d 813, 818-19
(1959).
32. See City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614
(1958); City of Stanberry v. O'Neal, 166 Mo. App. 709, 150 S.W. 1104
(1912). Contra, State ex rel. Sheahan v. Mulally, 257 Minn. 27, 99 N.W.2d
892 (1959); State ex rel. Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 273 N.W.
233 (1937).
33.
Any person convicted of a violation of a municipal ordinance in any
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appeal from most municipal courts is governed by the Municipal
Court Act; appeals from cities of the first class (Minneapolis,
St. Paul, and Duluth), however, are governed by a separate muni-
cipal court act.34 The appeal does not, by itself, give rise to a
right to a jury trial." In 1959, the Minnesota legislature enacted
a statute providing that a person who appeals a conviction from
the municipal court to the district court "shall have the right to a
jury trial." 6 At the same session in which the legislature enacted
this statute, it enacted a separate statute providing that a defendant
who appeals from the St. Paul Municipal Court to the district court
"shall be entitled to a trial de novo therein, with or without a
jury. .. ."I' The legislature did not enact a separate provision
providing for a jury trial on appeals from either the Minneapolis
or Duluth municipal courts. The fact that a separate statute was
enacted to apply only to St. Paul created confusion over whether
the 1959 statute applied to all cities of the first class; if it did not
so apply, then persons convicted of violating a municipal ordi-
nance in either Minneapolis or Duluth would not be entitled to a
jury trial on appeal. However, State ex rel. Mattheisen v. District
Court" held that the 1959 statute did apply to cities of the first
class because that section is unqualified and authorizes appeals to
the district court from a conviction of an ordinance violation in
court may appeal from the conviction to the district court in the same
manner and with the same effect as provided by Minnesota Statutes,
Chapter 633, except that the appellant shall have the right to a jury
trial if he was not tried by jury in the municipal court.
MINN. STAT. § 484.63 (1961).
34. The general municipal court rules are provided in MINN. STAT.
ch. 488 (1961) and municipal court rules for cities of the first class
(Minneapolis, St. Paul and Duluth) are provided in MINN. STAT. ch. 488A
(1961). MINN. STAT. ch. 484 (1961) governs the procedure in the district
courts.
35. State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 79 N.W.2d 136 (1956); accord,
City of Birmingham v. Williams, 26 Ala. App. 200, 155 So. 877 (1934).
A few state courts have interpreted statutes without express provisions
for a jury trial as giving the convicted ordinance violator a right to ajury trial upon appeal. See, e.g., State v. District Court, 74 Wyo. 48, 283
P.2d 1023 (1955), where the statute provided that on appeal to the district
court the violation of an ordinance is considered to be the same as a
crime and must be tried in the same manner. Under statutes providing
that the appeal shall be in the nature of a criminal appeal, the courts
usually allow the convicted ordinance violator a jury trial upon appeal.
Ex parte Hall, 255 Ala. 98, 50 So. 2d 264 (1951); City of St. Louis v.
Moore, 288 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956); City of Clayton v. Nemours,
237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935 (1942); State v. Hauser, 137 Neh.
138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939). Ci., Note, De Novo Appeals from Municipal
Courts to Common Pleas Courts in Ohio, 17 U. CINc. L. Rnv. 159 (1948).
36. Minn. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 388, § 1, as amended, MINN. STAT.
§ 484.63 (1961).
37. MINN. STAT. § 488A.18(12) (1961).
38. 113 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1962).
10 [Vol. 47:93
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any court. The legislative history of the statute strongly supports
the court's reasoning."
The fact that under the uniformity doctrine of the Hoben case
a person charged with violating a municipal ordinance was en-
titled to a jury trial in the municipal court and the fact that the
1959 statute guaranteed a jury trial if that defendant appealed to
the district court created the possibility that such defendant could
receive two jury trials. This issue was raised in State ex rel.
Pidgeon v. Hall,4" where the defendant was charged with a vio-
lation of a municipal traffic regulation and was given a jury trial
in the municipal court under the Hoben uniformity rule. After
being convicted the defendant appealed to the district court and
39. Legislative history indicates that this argument was properly re-jected. When the bill to provide generally for a jury trial on appeals to
the district court (originally enacted as Minn. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 388,§ 1) was pending in the legislature, it contained language specifically ex-
cluding cities of the first class (Minneapolis, St. Paul and Duluth). Also
pending were two bills that, if passed, would provide jury trials in the
district court in appeals from the municipal courts of Minneapolis and
St. Paul. Subsequently, the language excluding cities of the first class was
omitted from the general appeal provision. The bill governing appeals
from the Minneapolis Municipal Court was then allowed to die; the bill
governing appeals from the St. Paul Municipal Court, however, was enacted
through oversight as MINN. STAT. § 488A.18(12) (1961). See generally the
summary of legislative history in Brief for Relator, pp. 11-19, State ex rel.
Mattheisen v. District Court, 261 Minn. 422, 113 N.W.2d 166 (1962).
When the general appeal statute was amended in 1961, it was located
in Minn. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 683, under the following title: "An Act re-
lating to municipal and justice of the peace courts except municipal courts
in cities of the first class . . . .. The prosecution in State v. Friswold,
116 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1962), argued that this title manifested a legis-
lative intent that the general appeal statute of 1959 was not to apply to
Minneapolis. The court rejected this argument. Since the Frisvold case
involved the 1959 version of the statute, the court was not compelled
to answer the question whether the 1961 amendment applies to cities of
the first class. This statute would seem to fall within the constitutional
limitation found in MwNN. CONST. art. IV, § 27, which provides that "no
law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in
its title." Since cities of the first class are expressly excepted from the title
of the act, the argument could be made that Minneapolis, Duluth, and
St. Paul are not within the appeal provision. However, since the original
provision was clearly applicable to first class cities and the amendment
was meant to remedy a particular problem raised by the Pidgeon case(the problem of two jury trials discussed in note 41 infra and accompanying
text), the more reasonable position would seem to be that the provision
was placed in the session laws under the restrictive title for more efficient
publication, and thus the applicability of the statute to cities of the first
class was not impaired by the amending sentence. Furthermore, it seems
likely that the legislature did not consider § 7 to be a substantive part
of Minn. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 683, since § 6 of that chapter contains an
almost identical provision. A duplication would not seem consistent with
sound legislative procedure; thus § 7 should not be considered a sub-
stantive part of chapter 683 and should not be restricted by its title.
40. 111 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1961).
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was denied a second jury trial. The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that under "the statutory law in existence at the time the
present case arose" the defendant was entitled to a second jury
trial upon appeal to the district court." The court observed, how-
ever, that the relevant appeal provisions had been amended since
the case arose, and thus "after July 1, 1961, a person charged with
the violation of a municipal ordinance is entitled to but one jury
trial. 42
IV. CHOICE OF FORUM FOR JURY TRIAL
A related problem is whether a defendant entitled to a jury
trial in a municipal court under the Hoben doctrine may waive
that right and thereafter assert his statutory right to a trial by
jury upon appeal to the district court. This question was recently
answered by the Minnesota court in State v. Friswold.4'3 There
the court concluded that the waiver did not affect the defendant's
statutory right to obtain a jury trial on appeal to a district court.
The case arose under the appeal provision as it read in 1959,
and under this provision, as interpreted in the Pidgeon case, the
accused ordinance violator was entitled to two jury trials if his
case was encompassed by the Hoben rule. Thus, the issue actually
decided in Friswold was that an accused municipal ordinance
violator may waive the first of the two jury trials to which he was
entitled without affecting his right to obtain the second.
Under the present appeal provision, a person appealing from
a conviction of an ordinance violation has a right to a jury trial
in the district court only if "he was not tried by jury in the munici-
pal court. '' 44 Whether under this provision the defendant may
waive his right to a jury trial under the Hoben doctrine in the
municipal court and subsequently assert his right to a jury trial
on appeal is unclear. Dicta in the Pidgeon case suggests that
under this statute, the availability of a jury trial in a municipal
court may preclude a jury trial upon appeal. The court stated that
"a person charged with the violation of a municipal ordinance is
entitled to but one jury trial. If he has been afforded a jury trial
in the municipal court and is convicted, he may appeal to the
district court but his trial in that court will then be to the court
41. Id. at 474. Minn. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 388, § 1, provided the ordi-
nance violator with an absolute right to a jury trial on appeal to the dis-
trict court.
42. Id. at 475. The court was taking notice of MINN. STAT. § 484.63
(1961).
43. 116 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1962).
44. MINN. STAT. § 484.63 (1961).
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without a jury."45 A literal reading of the statute, however, in-
dicates that the legislature intended that the defendant should have
a choice between a jury trial in the municipal court and a jury
trial upon appeal to the district court. The only qualification to
obtaining a jury trial upon appeal seems to be that the appellant
was not tried by jury in the municipal court. 6 If the defendant
has waived a jury trial in the municipal court he was not in fact
tried by a jury in that court and would thus be able to claim such
a right under this statute. Furthermore, the legislature by en-
acting the appeal provision, which gave the accused a right to a
jury trial in the district court rather than in the municipal court,
may have thought that only with a jury trial in the district court
could the accused ordinance violator receive a fair determination
of his guilt. The rights of a defendant in a municipal court may
not be adequately protected if the municipal court judge or justice
of the peace is either incompetent or fraudulent or if the proceed-
ings are subject to local prejudice.4
Allowing the defendant to waive a jury trial in municipal court
and subsequently demand a jury trial upon appeal to the district
court arguably may afford the defendant an unfair advantage.
After hearing the prosecution's case in the municipal court, the
defendant may rest his case without disclosing the nature of his
defense.49 An ordinance prosecution is analogous to a criminal
proceeding, because one of the parties is the state. Since "a crim-
inal case is of necessity an unequal contest, because the parties
are of unequal strength ' 50 and the state is the stronger party, the
45. 111 N.W.2d at 475. (Emphasis added.)
46. See MINN. STAT. § 484.63 (1961), which provides that "the ap-
pellant shall have the right to a jury trial if he was not tried by jury in the
municipal court."
47. See City of St. Paul v. Ulmer, 261 Minn. 178, 111 N.W.2d 612
(1961), which suggests that a defendant must take some affirmative action
in order to waive a jury trial under the Hoben doctrine. In this case the
defendant, who was charged with driving while under the influence, re-
fused to plead and stood mute throughout the trial. The court said this
was not a waiver of a jury trial.
48. See generally ANDERSON, LocAL GOVERNMENT AND FINANCE IN
MINNEsoTA 278 (1935); Keebler, Our Justice of the Peace Courts-A
Problem in Justice, 9 TENN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1930); Lee, The Emergence
and Evolution of a Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial Before a Justice
of the Peace, 20 FED. BJ. 111, 124 (1960); Pirsig, The Proposed Amend-
ment of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution, 40 MINN.
L. REv. 815, 828 (1956); 46 MINN. L. REv. 403 (1961); Minneapolis
Morning Tribune, April 9, 1962, p. 1, col. 3; id., April 10, 1962, p. 1,
col. 3; id., April 11, 1962, p. 1, col. 6; cf. People v. Braun, 375 Ill. 284,
31 N.E.2d 287 (1940); note 1 supra and accompanying text.
49. See Affidayit of Paul T. Aitken, p. 3, incorporated by reference into
Brief -for Relatok, State'v. Friswold, 116 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1962).
50. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RiGHTs 2 (1958).
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defendant's use of such a "discovery device" would not seem ob-
jectionable in an ordinance prosecution. Professor Louisell has
observed that
viewing the matter simply as one of balancing the scales in an advers-
ary system . . . it is hard to believe that in the generality of drunk
driving cases, for example, discovery for defendant unduly handicaps
the prosecution. To the contrary, the latter's increasing facilities for
scientific aids seem to necessitate criminal discovery for a fair trial,
particularly as to data pertaining to scientific tests.51
In any event, the cost of an appeal to the district court may deter
a majority of defendants from waiving their right to a jury trial
in municipal court in order to acquire knowledge of the prose-
cution's case.52
Granting the accused ordinance violator a jury trial in district
court after he has waived his right to jury trial in municipal court
has also been criticized because it affords this defendant greater
procedural rights than are available to a person charged with a
similar violation under a state statute.5 A defendant charged
under a state statute has a right to a jury trial only in the court
where he is originally charged, while the defendant charged under
a municipal ordinance would be able to choose between the muni-
cipal court and the district court for his jury trial. Such a dis-
parity does not contravene the "uniformity doctrine" of the Hoben
case, however, since that doctrine is designed to provide municipal
ordinance violators with minimal procedural safeguards and is
not meant to deny them additional safeguards.
Ordinance and statute violations have historically been classified and
treated separately, both by the legislature and by the courts. We do
not perceive how the fact that an ordinance violator may receive
two jury trials conflicts with the uniformity requirement of the Hoben
case. This decision was made to insure to traffic ordinance violators
basic constitutional and statutory safeguards equivalent to those af-
51. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 56, 100 n.190 (1961). Professor Louisell's article provides
an analysis of the problems and advantages of affording discovery pro-
cedures in a criminal action.
52. For example, in Minneapolis less than one per cent of all persons
convicted of ordinance violations appeal to the district court. Interview
with the clerk of the Minneapolis Municipal Court, March 16, 1962. See
also 23 INT'L CITY MANAGERS' ASS'N, MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 465 (1956).
In 50 non-metropolitan counties of Minnesota, the number of appeals from
municipal ordinance violation convictions is so small that the effect on the
district court calendar is negligible. As pointed out in the appendix to the
defendant's brief in State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 79 N.W.2d 136
(1956). only 62 such appeals were made between 1946 and 1956.
53. See Brief for Relator, p. 3, State v. Friswold, 116 N.W.2d 270
(Minn. 1962).
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forded to traffic statute violators. It did not hold that such ordi-
nance violators and such statute violators must be afforded identical
treatment beyond these basic rights. The intent of the legislature in
enacting § 169.03, as declared in the Hoben case, was to make uni-
form and equal procedures relating to these basic rights and not to
require that the legislature treat each class equally or limit preferen-
tial treatment beyond these rights.5
If strict uniformity of treatment is desirable, the better solution
would seem to be to accord the statute violator more rights than
to accord the ordinance violator fewer rights.
V. EFFECT OF JURY TRIALS ON THE COURTS
The summary enforcement of municipal ordinances has en-
abled the courts to efficiently dispose of the great number of cases
arising under such ordinances.' To grant persons accused of
an ordinance violation the right to a jury trial, instead of the more
common summary proceedings, does add to the congestion in
court calendars.56 For example, prior to Hoben the delay in the
Minneapolis Municipal Court calendar was approximately three
months, while after the Hoben case the delay was nearly two
years.57 In order to relieve this congestion, lawyers, judges, and
other officials responsible for the efficient administration of the
courts, have directed their efforts toward obtaining additional
54. State v. Friswold, 116 N.W.2d 270, 273-74 (Minn. 1962).
55. See generally 9 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27.34
(3d ed. 1950); MAYERs, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 200 (1955); Frank-
furter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaran-
ty of Trial by Jury, 39 H.nv. L. REV. 917, 925 (1926); Note, 24 GEo.
L.J. 440, 441 (1936). The court in City of Fort Scott v. Arbuckle, 165
Kan. 374, 388-89, 196 P.2d 217, 226 (1948), observed that "due to the
complexity of city life there are many more acts, the doing of which con-
stitute a violation of some city ordinance, than there are that constitute
a violation of state statutes." See also 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*280-81.
1 The term "summary proceeding" as used in this Note refers to a trial
without a jury..
56. See Healy, Emergency Stop-Gap Program to Relieve Congested
Civil Calendar in Municipal Court Put into Effect, 29 HEN. LAw. 3
(1960); Edgerton, May Be Legal Way Out on Jury Ruling, Minneapolis
Star, Sept. 25, 1959, p. 8A, cols. 6-7: "When cases are tried before a
judge, one judge can handle more than 200 cases a day. But when jury
trials are requested three judges can not dispose of more than nine cases
in an entire week." Cf. the N.Y. CrrY MUNICIPAL COURT ANNUAL
REPORT 2-3 (1960), which indicates that in New York, from 1957 to
1960, the number of cases awaiting trial increased from 46,292 to 54,651-
an increase of 18%. At the end of. 1960 a delay of 7 to 19 months existed
on the 4 central jury calendars of the court, while a delay of 4 to 6 months
existed for a non-jury trial.
57. Healy, supra note 56.
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judges and instituting more efficient modes of pleading and pre-
sentation of facts instead of eliminating the right of an ordi-
nance violator to a jury trial. 8
The use of summary proceedings rather than jury trials for the
enforcement of municipal ordinances depends, in part, upon eco-
nomics. The cost of a jury trial has been estimated to be three
to eight times more than that of any other mode of trial."9 This
added cost must be weighed against the needs of the defendant.
If the interests of the individual defendant charged with an ordi-
nance violation were insignificant, a jury trial would not be war-
ranted. Each defendant's rights are significant, however, to the
individual involved.
Each case concerns the liberty or property of some individual ....
Each case, regardless of amount, can be as important to its parties
as any in the history of jurisprudence . . . . Let us not forget that
amount of money involved in a case is not always a true measure
of its importance.60
The consequences to the defendant convicted in a municipal or-
dinance violation proceeding would seem to justify the added cost
58. The report of a special Bar Association Subcommittee established
to analyze the congestion in the municipal court and to recommend certain
remedies stated:
The basic premise approved by the Subcommittee recognized that
the right of trial by jury in traffic and ordinance cases, though it
delays the trial of civil cases, . . . is a sound and basic principle,
that the basic remedy is the addition of enough Judges to insure the
right of trial by jury to all.
This subcommittee recommended as a temporary relief measure an ac-
celerated hearing procedure for any civil case now pending. See Healy,
supra note 56, at 4. Another procedural technique that may alleviate the
backlog is outlined in First Attack on Wiping Out Calendar Delay Made,
30 HENN. LAW. 61 (1962). The appointment of additional judges, of
course, reduces the delay. Rodgers, Strenuous Measures Must Be Taken
to Up-Date Calendars, 30 HENN. LAW. 37 (1961).
59. SUTHERLAND, DEBATE HANDBOOK ON LAW'S DELAY AND TRIAL JURY
163 (1929). See generally FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIoHTS 109 (1958).
60. Barker & Scallen, Reports Are Made by Referees Who Are Named
to Assist in Stop-Gap Municipal Court Program, 29 HENN. LAW. 19, 20
(1960). Professor Pirsig has observed:
The notion of a layman, ignorant of the law, deciding the legal
rights of parties in civil litigation and of defendants in criminal cases
is wholly irreconcilable with the fundamental tenet of our govern-
ment that justice shall be administered in accordance with established
principles of law and not at the whim, or caprice or personal notions
of justice held by some individual exercising the power of the state.
The fact that the amount of litigation is small or that the crimes
charged are minor ones does not in a democratic society alter the
application of this fundamental philosophy.
Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minne-
sota Constitution, 40 MINN. L. REV. 815, 828 (1956), (Emphasis added.)
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of a jury trial. The penalties upon conviction may include a fine,
imprisonment, and such other consequences as the loss of a license
that may be essential to the defendant's livelihood." Even if a
person is not convicted, he may need a jury trial to combat the
collateral effects of being charged with the violation of a public
law.
The accused, whether guilty or not, is in immediate trouble ...
He may lose his job, or be suspended from it, pending trial. His
reputation is under an immediate cloud. His family relationships may
be irretrievably altered. If he happens to be in a profession where
good reputation is peculiarly indispensible, he may suffer grievously,
though completely innocent . . . . A defendant, in short, is in a bad
spot, merely by virtue of being one, and needs every possible op-
portunity to establish his innocence, as soon, as publicly, and as de-
cisively as possible. 62
Opponents of jury trials in municipal courts sometimes con-
tend that the jury is likely to be too lenient with the offenders.'
Continued acquittals by juries would seem to imply lack of public
disapproval of the defendant's act. Our system of justice seeks
to punish those acts that contravene the purposes of society; ap-
parent approval of the defendant's conduct would suggest that
such conduct does not contravene the mores of our society and,
therefore, should not be prosecuted."
61. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CrrY CHARTER, ch. 4, § 16 (1960):
Any license issued by authority of the City Council may be revoked
by the Mayor or City Council at any time, and upon conviction be-
fore the Municipal Court of the City of Minneapolis, or any person
holding a license for a violation of the provisions of any ordinance
relating to the exercise of any right granted by such license, the said
court may, and upon second conviction shall, revoke such license
in addition to the penalties provided by law or by ordinance for any
such violation.
In the case of traffic ordinance convictions a defendant may have his
driver's license suspended or revoked. MINN. STAT. §§ 171.17, .18 (1961).
Furthermore, his automobile insurance may be canceled or the cost of
the premiums may become prohibitive.
62. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT's RIGHTS 2 (1958).
63. " 'Juries tend to feel excessive sympathy for a defendant.' A judge,
on the other hand, has heard all the excuses before . . . ." Forest E.
Lowery, manager of the Greater Minneapolis Safety Council, responding
to the Hoben decision in Minneapolis Morning Tribune, Sept. 23, 1959,
p. 1, col. 1.
64. See City of Rochester v. Falk, 7 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Rochester Crim.
Ct. 1938). See generally Kalven, A Report On The Jury Project of the
University of Chicago Law School, 24 INs. COUNSEL J. 368 (1957). The
records for the Minneapolis Municipal Court do indicate a greater nr-
centage of acquittals since the Hoben case for the offense of driving while
intoxicated. For example, in 1958 there were only five findings of not
guilty out of 1798 cases; in 1959 there were 20 findings of not guilty out
of 1648 cases; in 1960 there were 27 findings of not guilty out of 1293.
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A further argument against this use of the jury trial might
be premised upon a lack of faith in the ability of a jury to deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of a defendant."5 An attack upon the
competency of the jury system, though, should be directed to the
legislature, not the courts. The legislature's answer to such an
argument is expressed in the statute interpreted in Hoben, which
affords a defendant the right to a jury trial in the municipal court,
and in another statute that specifically grants that right upon ap-
peal to the district court if the defendant did not receive a jury
trial in the municipal court.
CONCLUSION
In Minnesota, the right of persons accused of violating a munici-
pal ordinance to a jury trial in the municipal court is dependent
upon three conditions: (1) a state statute must prohibit the same
conduct as prohibited by the municipal ordinance; (2) the state
statute must contain a provision requiring any municipal ordinance
covering the same subject to provide for identical penalties as the
statute; (3) a person charged with violating that statute must be
entitled to a jury trial in the court where he is charged. If a person
is convicted of violating any municipal ordinance, he is entitled
to a jury trial upon appeal to the district court if he was not tried
by a jury in the municipal court. This right is justified by the de-
sire to protect the interests of the defendant from the arbitrary
procedures that are often present in a summary proceeding. Al-
though this use of the jury trial has greatly increased the con-
gestion in municipal court calendars, the addition of more judges
and the instigation of more efficient modes of pleading seem to
be more reasonable solutions to the problem than the denial to the
alleged ordinance violator of the right to trial by jury.
An interesting aspect of these statistics is that the total number of cases
reaching municipal court involving the Hoben offense (driving while in-
toxicated) has decreased considerably since that decision. This may be
attributable to the fact that police officers have been more cautious with
their charges since defendants will be able to demand a jury trial in the
municipal court. See 1958, 1959, 1960 MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP'T ANN.
REP.
65. SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 59.
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